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INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Supreme Court has become more concerned with
finding the appropriate rationale for its decisions than with its deci-
sions' substantive effects.' In few areas of law is this more evident
than in the Court's contemporary Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence. Because the Court has failed to consider how lower appellate
courts review Confrontation Clause violations, its newly fashioned ra-
tionale for the Confrontation Clause and its purported expansion of
the substantive scope of the right of confrontation are at odds with the
I See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (explaining that
violations of the right to the effective assistance of counsel are trial errors and subject to
harmless error review, not because the violations are any less severe than other structural
defects, but because "the requirement of showing prejudice in ineffectiveness claims stems
from the very definition of the right at issue"); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60
(2004) ("Although the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.").
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application of harmless error review to all Confrontation Clause viola-
tions. This Note argues that unless courts begin treating some Con-
frontation Clause violations as structural defects, the remedies
available to criminal defendants-and consequently, the de facto
scope of the right of confrontation-will remain unchanged.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause gives all criminal
defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against"
them.2 The Confrontation Clause involves, at its core, four procedu-
ral safeguards-in-person testimony by witnesses, testimony given
under oath, testimony subject to cross-examination, and testimony
where the jury can observe a witness's demeanor." The third safe-
guard-the requirement that testimony be subject to cross-examina-
tion-has been the subject of much recent controversy. Just thirty
years ago, in Ohio v. Roberts,4 the Supreme Court decided that the
right of confrontation did not grant the defendant the right to cross-
examine absolutely everyone. Instead, the Court held that if a judge
could determine that a person's statement was sufficiently reliable on
its own, then the judge could admit that person's statement without
violating the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.5 In effect, the
Court decreed that defendants do not have a right to cross-examina-
tion per se; rather, they have a right to the goal of cross-examination-
reliable testimony. In 2004, the Supreme Court overruled Roberts in
Crawford v. Washington6 and announced a dramatic about-face: the
right of confrontation is not "merely" a right to reliable testimony but
is a right to cross-examination per se. 7
Since Crawford, the Court has continued to expand the substan-
tive scope of the right of confrontation, holding inadmissible victims'
statements to the police;8 out-of-court, unconfronted statements of
murder victims (except where the accused killed the victim specifically
for the purpose of preventing the victim's testimony);9 and certificates
of laboratory analysts stating that the substances found on defendants
were illegal narcotics,' 0 while only cautiously admitting transcripts of
911 calls.' 1 However, the Court has not yet addressed what I term the
procedural scope of the right of confrontation: whether Confrontation
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3 See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990).
4 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
5 See id. at 66 (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)).
6 541 U.S. 36.
7 See id. at 67-68.
8 See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30, 834 (2006).
9 See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2688 (2008).
10 See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).
11 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 826-29.
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Clause violations, when reviewed on appeal, should be treated as ei-
ther trial errors or structural defects.
Prior to Crawford, all Confrontation Clause violations were trial
errors subject to harmless error review on appeal. 12 Under this stan-
dard, a violation of the Confrontation Clause at trial would only upset
the resulting conviction if the violation was harmful; if the error was
harmless, the appellate court would affirm the conviction.13 An error
is harmful in this context if the admission of evidence in violation of
the Confrontation Clause "affect[s] the reliability of the factfinding
process at trial."14 The Court engages in three different types of
harmless error review. Some trial errors, such as permitting represen-
tation by an attorney with a conflict of interest, require only a cursory
inquiry into the harmfulness of the error.15 Most, like pre-Crawford
Confrontation Clause violations, require the prosecution to prove the
error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' 6 And a few, such as the
ineffective assistance of counsel, require the defendant to prove that
the error was harmful.' 7 Despite treating these three types of errors
differently, the Court has never explicitly categorized them as any-
thing but trial errors.
The only line the Court has explicitly drawn differentiates be-
tween trial errors and what it terms structural defects.18 Structural de-
fects are broadly defined as constitutional violations that "affect[ ] the
framework within which the trial proceeds."' 9 If an appellate court
determines that a structural defect contaminated the proceeding be-
low, it must overturn the underlying conviction without any further
12 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980) (ineffective assistance of counsel
based on a conflict of interest); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271-72 (1959) (knowing
use of false testimony by the prosecution).
16 See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Chapman v. California,
386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
17 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87-88 (1963).
18 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991). Structural defects include the
denial of the right to counsel, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); denial of
the right to an impartial adjudicator, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 535 (1927);
denial of the right to self-representation, see McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78
(1984); unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, see Vas-
quez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1986) ("[D]iscrimination in the grand jury under-
mines the structural integrity of the criminal tribunal itself, and is not amenable to
harmless-error review."); denial of the right to a public trial, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39, 49 (1984); and denial of the right to the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof,
see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).
19 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
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inquiry-in effect, the appellate court presumes the harmfulness of
these errors.20
Since Crawford, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether all
Confrontation Clause violations remain subject to some form of harm-
less error review. The Court treats the substantive scope and procedu-
ral scope of the right of confrontation as separate and distinct issues,
typically declining to state any opinion on the former despite ex-
pounding at great length on the latter.2' Although Chief Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist argued in his partial concurrence in Crawford that the
majority provided "implicit recognition that the mistaken application
of its new rule . . . is subject to harmless-error analysis," 22 the Court
has not adopted this position despite at least two direct challenges to
Delaware v. Van Arsdal 3 since Crawford.24 Furthermore, other areas of
the Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence have failed to
shed any light on the issue: while United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez 5 com-
pared post-Crawford Confrontation Clause violations to violations of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice, which are structural
defects, Whorton v. Bockting26 distinguished the right of confrontation
from the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel largely on the
ground that Crawford had little net effect on the reliability of criminal
trials.
This Note argues that analysis of the procedural and substantive
scope of the right of confrontation cannot be so easily separated. If
the purpose of the right of confrontation is to prevent the evil of ex
parte examinations, a review process that focuses on how a violation
affects the reliability of the proceeding, rather than the egregiousness
of the violation itself, is profoundly inadequate. Accordingly, this
Note proposes that courts should distinguish between complete and
20 See id.
21 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2531 (2009); id. at 2542
n.14 (holding that the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of the written certifi-
cates of state laboratory analysts stating that the substance found on the defendant was
cocaine but expressing "no view as to whether the error was harmless"); Davis v. Washing-
ton, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) ("[The Washington Supreme Court] also concluded that,
even if [there was a Confrontation Clause violation, it] was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Davis does not challenge that holding, and we therefore assume it to be correct.");
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 n.1 (2004) ("The State also has not challenged
the Court of Appeals' conclusion . . . that the confrontation violation, if it occurred, was
not harmless. We express no opinion on these matters.").
22 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
23 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
24 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abu Ali v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009)
(No. 08-464), 2008 WL 4533652 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abu Ali]; Peti-
tion for Writ of Certiorari, Shisinday v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. 62 (2008) (No. 07-1383),
2008 WL 2020334 [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shisinday].
25 548 U.S. 140, 145-48 (2006).
26 549 U.S. 406, 419 (2007).
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partial Confrontation Clause violations and treat complete Confronta-
tion Clause violations as more like structural defects.
This Note defines a partial Confrontation Clause violation as any im-
proper limit or constraint on a defendant's cross-examination of a wit-
ness, such as prohibiting the defendant from asking particular
questions or shortening the time permitted for cross-examination. A
complete Confrontation Clause violation is any action that effectively
prevents a defendant from cross-examining a witness at all, such as
allowing a prosecutor to play a prerecorded statement of a witness in
place of live testimony or excluding the defendant and defense coun-
sel from certain portions of the proceedings.27 Partial Confrontation
Clause violations should remain subject to harmless error review-the
potential variation in their scope and effect may make some violations
trivial, and requiring the reversal of a conviction for such inevitable,
minor errors would consume enormous resources and tarnish the
public's perception of the criminal justice system. Complete Confron-
tation Clause violations, however, are never trivial, and the continued
practice of subjecting them to harmless error review, thereby implying
that they may be harmless, risks tarnishing the public's perception of
the criminal justice system in the opposite way-creating the percep-
tion that the system does not care about defendants' rights. Although
a few courts have attempted to make similar distinctions, there has yet
been no serious reconsideration of the requirement that Confronta-
tion Clause violations be subject to harmless error review in the wake
of Crawford.28
This Note makes three arguments for treating the most egregious
Confrontation Clause violations as structural errors. First, the core
concern in harmless error review is whether the error undermined
the reliability of the proceeding. 29 Thus, except where the witness's
testimony was purely cumulative or irrelevant or where the prosecu-
tion's case was overwhelming, the primary inquiry in the harmless er-
ror analysis of Confrontation Clause violations will be the reliability of
27 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abu Ali, supra note 24, at 22-23 (arguing that the
Supreme Court "has declared that the 'denial or significant diminution' of the right to
cross-examine calls into question the 'integrity of the fact-finding process'" (quoting
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973))).
28 The only decisions distinguishing between Confrontation Clause violations based
on their egregiousness to determine whether to apply harmless error or structural defect
review predate Crawford. See, e.g., Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 898-900 (9th Cir. 2002);
Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1141-45 (9th Cir. 1996); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472,
1477-78 (9th Cir. 1995); State v. Garcia-Contreras, 953 P.2d 536, 540-41 (Ariz. 1998); State
v. Calderon, 13 P.3d 871, 878-79 (Kan. 2000); State v. Bird, 43 P.3d 266, 269-73 (Mont.
2002). However, at least one judge has continued to argue that Confrontation Clause
violations may amount to structural defects. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931,
1010 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
29 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
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the wrongfully admitted evidence.30 To make this determination, re-
viewing courts will have to search for the same sort of "indicia of relia-
bility"31 previously required for the admission of out-of-court
statements under Roberts. Because reliable out-of-court statements do
not threaten the reliability of the proceedings, the Supreme Court has
thus created a right without a (complete) remedy: any conviction re-
sulting from a Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford will not
be overturned unless it also would have been a violation of the Con-
frontation Clause under Roberts.
Second, treating Confrontation Clause violations like structural
defects is more consonant with contemporary interpretations of the
Sixth Amendment. The Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence reflects a marked anti-inquisitorialism-the theory that the
core evil that the Sixth Amendment was designed to prevent was the
creation of an inquisitorial, or civil law-style, system of criminal proce-
dure.32 Crawford makes it clear that the right of confrontation pro-
tects a core safeguard against inquisitorialism: the right of criminal
defendants to ensure the reliability of evidence through active partici-
pation in the proceedings-a role the defendant cannot play in in-
quisitorial systems.33 Permitting judicial-reliability assessments in lieu
of cross-examination is precisely the inquisitorial evil Crawford set out
to undo.34 Yet, harmless error review requires exactly that: a review-
ing court must make its own determination as to the reliability of the
evidence to determine whether the error was harmless. Moreover, by
forbidding trial courts from making such reliability determinations,
30 Cf id. ("The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of
the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
31 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (quoting Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204,
213 (1972)).
32 See David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1634, 1642-56
(2009).
33 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004):
The right to confront one's accusers is a concept that dates back to Roman
times. ... English common law has long differed from continental civil law
in regard to the manner in which witnesses give testimony in criminal trials.
The common-law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to adver-
sarial testing, while the civil law condones examination in private by judicial
officers.
It is not clear whether the Court's analysis would be affected by, or if indeed it is even
aware of, the fact that many modem civil law or inquisitorial systems provide criminal
defendants with something akin to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. See, e.g.,
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 6(3), cl. (d), Nov. 4, 1950, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing every criminal defendant with
the right "to examine or have examined witnesses against him").
34 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 ("Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.").
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Crawford forces appellate courts to ascertain the reliability of evidence
in the first instance with only the cold record before them.
Third, classifying the most egregious Confrontation Clause viola-
tions as structural defects comports with the broader justifications of
the trial-error/structural-defect dichotomy. The Court in Arizona v.
Fulminantes5 explained that trial errors are those errors which occur
"during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may there-
fore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence
presented in order to determine whether [the error] was harmless,"
while structural defects affect "the framework within which the trial
proceeds"3 6 and violate rights so basic that "'a criminal trial cannot
reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or
innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as funda-
mentally fair.'" 3 7 In holding that violations of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel of choice are structural defects, the Court has stressed
that prejudice is appropriately presumed because "[i] t is impossible to
know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made,
and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the out-
come of the proceedings."38 Complete Confrontation Clause viola-
tions at least qualify for a rule of automatic reversal; much like
violations of the right to counsel of choice, assessing prejudice in the
Confrontation Clause context presents courts with the difficult task of
assessing the potential impact of a number of hypothetical scenarios.
Violations of this magnitude directly undermine the framework in
which the trial proceeds by gutting the core meaning of an adversarial
proceeding and by demonstrating a profound lack of respect for the
defendant's role in the criminal process. This Note further argues
that the Court's unwillingness to challenge the presumption that
harmless error review applies to Confrontation Clause violations stems
from a conflation of rules of evidence-which are almost always con-
sidered trial errors-with constitutional rules of criminal procedure
that operate like rules of evidence, such as violations of a suspect's
Miranda rights,39 which courts ought to treat more seriously.40
35 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
36 See id. at 307-08, 310.
37 Id. at 310 (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
38 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
39 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-08 (1985) (holding that voluntary state-
ments taken in violation of Miranda may be admitted for impeachment on cross-
examination).
40 See, e.g., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988) (discussing the admission of
evidence at the sentencing stage of a capital case that violated of the Sixth Amendment's
Counsel Clause); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377-77 (1972) (discussing a confes-
sion obtained in violation of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53 (1970) (discussing the admission of evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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This Note proceeds in five Parts. Part I discusses recent develop-
ments in the Supreme Court's trial-error/structural-defect and Con-
frontation Clause jurisprudence and the intersection of these two
bodies of law in the wake of Crawford. Part II argues that, unless the
Court reconsiders the requirement of harmless error review, the sub-
stantive scope of the right of confrontation will be confined to the
limits of Roberts. Part III argues that applying harmless error review to
Confrontation Clause violations permits evidence to be introduced
based on a judicial determination of reliability, which is precisely the
inquisitorial evil Crawford aimed to prevent. Part IV argues that apply-
ing harmless error review to Confrontation Clause violations in the
wake of Crawford is inconsistent with the general principles the Court
has outlined for distinguishing structural defects from trial errors.
Part V proposes categorizing Confrontation Clause violations into two
types of violations-complete violations and partial violations-and
treating complete violations as structural defects while retaining harm-
less error review for partial violations. A conclusion follows.
1
BACKGROUND
A. The Emergence of the Trial-Error/Structural-Defect
Dichotomy
Chapman v. California4-which involved a violation of the Con-
frontation Clause-fashioned the modern harmless error rule for fed-
eral criminal-procedural violations. 42 The Chapman Court, however,
failed to articulate any principled means for distinguishing between
errors subject to harmless error review and errors requiring automatic
reversal; it merely noted that "our prior cases have indicated that
there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."43 Nearly a quarter-
century later, Fulminante somewhat clarified the distinction: violations
subject to harmless error review are called trial errors and are (not very
helpfully) defined as errors "in the trial process itself"; violations re-
quiring automatic reversal are called structural defects and are defined
as errors that "affect[ ] the framework within which the trial pro-
ceeds."44 While the Court has now applied harmless error review to
most constitutional errors,45 the Court has also gradually expanded
4 386 U.S. 18 (1967)
42 Id. at 22-23 (1967).
43 Id. at 23.
44 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
45 See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-54 (1990) (unconstitutionally
overbroad jury instructions at the sentencing stage of a capital case); Carella v. California,
491 U.S. 263, 266-67 (1989) (per curiam) (jury instruction containing an erroneous con-
2011] 405
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the set of errors classified as structural defects to include: the denial of
the right to counsel;46 denial of the right to an impartial adjudica-
tor;47 denial of the right of self-representation;48 unlawful exclusion of
members of the defendant's race from a grand jury;49 denial of the
right to public trial;50 and denial of the right to the beyond-a-reasona-
ble-doubt burden of proof.5 '
Although the Supreme Court has only explicitly distinguished be-
tween trial errors and structural defects, the Court has in fact applied
four different levels of harmless error review to trial errors. Some er-
rors, such as an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected coun-
sel's performance, require only a minimal finding of prejudice.52 The
majority of trial errors, including violations of the Confrontation
Clause, require the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error was harmless.5 3 A few trial errors, most notably ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, actually require the defendant to demon-
strate prejudice.5 4  Lastly, trial errors when on review in federal
habeas proceedings must be shown to have a "'substantial and injuri-
ous effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."' 5 5
clusive presumption); Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258 (admission of evidence at the sentencing
stage of a capital case in violation of the Sixth Amendment Counsel Clause); Pope v. Illi-
nois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 (1987) (jury instruction misstating an element of the offense);
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579-82 (1986) (jury instruction containing an erroneous re-
buttable presumption); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 (1986) (erroneous exclusion
of defendant's testimony regarding the circumstances of his confession); Rushen v. Spain,
464 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1983) (denial of a defendant's right to be present at all "critical"
stages of trial and to be represented by counsel); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,
510-12 (1983) (improper comment on defendant's silence at trial in violation of the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 610 (1982) (stat-
ute improperly forbidding a trial court from giving ajury instruction on a lesser included
offense in a capital case in violation of the Due Process Clause); Kentucky v. Whorton, 441
U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979) (failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence);
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977) (admission of identification evidence in viola-
tion of the Sixth Amendment); Milton, 407 U.S. at 377-78 (confession obtained in viola-
tion of Massiah, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970)
(denial of counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment's Counsel
Clause); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52-53 (admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment).
46 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-44 (1963).
47 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 529-34 (1927).
48 See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 (1984).
49 See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1986).
50 See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984).
51 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1993).
52 See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50 (1980); see also Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264, 271-72 (1959) (knowing use of false testimony by the prosecution).
53 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986); Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 22-23 (1967).
54 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); see also Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
55 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Although Confrontation Clause violations may be sub-
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The trial-error/structural-defect dichotomy has drawn considera-
ble criticism. The Court has never adequately explained why all struc-
tural defects require automatic reversal or why courts cannot reverse
all trial errors without a determination of harmfulness. 56 The Court
in Rose v. Clark argued that structural defects, by eroding such basic
procedural protections, so thoroughly undermine the reliability of a
criminal trial that no punishment could be deemed fundamentally
fair.57 But this argument assumes the truth of what it purports to
prove-that structural defects encompass all and only those basic pro-
cedural protections necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. Nor
are structural defects obviously more fundamental than trial errors;
the failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence5 8 is
not obviously less harmful than the denial of the right to an impartial
adjudicator.59 The distinction between denial of the right to counsel
at trial6 o and denial of the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing 1
is hazy at best. The Court's ad hoc approach to categorizing structural
defects and trial errors makes it all the less clear why Confrontation
Clause violations remain classified as trial errors.
B. Roberts- Reducing the Confrontation Clause to a Substantive
Guarantee
A literal reading of the Confrontation Clause suggests that it codi-
fies a procedural protection: in every criminal trial, a defendant has
the right to "confront[ ]," meaning (among other things) to cross-ex-
amine, each witness who testifies against her or him.62 The historical
context surrounding this Clause lends further support to this reading.
Prior to America's independence, dissatisfaction with the British prac-
tice of ex parte prosecution-as seen in Sir Walter Raleigh's trial-was
prevalent among the American colonists.6 3 Raleigh's alleged accom-
plice, Lord Cobham, implicated Raleigh in both testimony before the
ject to this standard in habeas proceedings, this Note focuses on the Chapman-Van Arsdall
standard applied to Confrontation Clause violations on direct review.
56 See Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic Reversal of Structural Errors,
117 YALE L.J. 1180, 1182-83 (2008) (arguing that the severity of the automatic-reversal
remedy for structural defects has led courts to weaken the underlying constitutional
rights).
57 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986).
58 See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979) (per curiam) (holding that
failure to instruct ajury on the presumption of innocence does not itself require reversal).
59 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (holding that any procedure that
might tempt a judge to forget the burden of proof denies due process of law).
60 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61 See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44-45 (2004); see also The Trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh, knt. at Winchester, for High Treason: 1 James I. 17th of November, A.D. 1603, in 2 CoB-
BETrS COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND
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Privy Council and a letter.64 During Raleigh's trial, the transcript of
Cobham's testimony and letter were read to the jury.65 Raleigh ar-
gued that Cobham had lied and demanded that the judges order Cob-
ham to appear as a witness.6 6 The judges refused, and Raleigh was
convicted and sentenced to death.6 7 One of Raleigh's trial judges
would later lament that "'the justice of England has never been so
degraded and injured as by the condemnation of Sir Walter Ra-
leigh."' 68 In reaction to such practices, many early decisions con-
strued the right of confrontation quite strictly,69 some even going so
far as to hold any out-of-court statements inadmissible even when the
defendant was able to cross-examine the speaker at the time the state-
ments were made.70
During the twentieth century, the Supreme Court reframed Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence in terms of what it perceived to be the ulti-
mate goal of the Sixth Amendment: ensuring reliable outcomes at
trial. In Roberts, the court held that cross-examination is not the only
constitutionally acceptable means to guarantee the reliability of evi-
dence offered at trial.71 The facts of Roberts were a near-perfect illus-
tration of how a formalistic reading of the Confrontation Clause can
create unsavory results. The case involved allegations of forgery.72
The defendant argued that the victim's daughter had allowed him to
use her parents' credit cards and checkbook.73 The daughter denied
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMFANOIRS 1, 15-16 (London, R. Bagshaw 1809) [hereinafter Trial
of Sir Walter Raleighl.
64 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.
65 1 DAVID JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435 (London, Charles Knight 1832).
66 Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 63, at 15-16.
67 Id. at 31.
68 JARDINE, supra note 65, at 520.
69 See, e.g., United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1137 (C.C.D. 11. 1851) (No.
15,702) (admissibility of prior testimony only permitted where there was a previous oppor-
tunity for cross-examination); Commonwealth v Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434, 437
(1837) (same); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 435-36 (1858) (same); State v. Webb, 2 N.C.
(1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (1794) (depositions could be read against the accused only if taken in
her or his presence); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 132 (1844) (same); State v.
Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 608-10 (1835) (admissibility of prior testimony only permitted
where there was a previous opportunity for cross-examination); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn.
(10 Hum.) 479, 485-88 (1850) (same); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344, 345-46
(1842) (same); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 59 (1821) (depositions could be
read against the accused only if taken in her or his presence where there is proof that the
witness is dead); see also I JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 1093, at 688-89 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 2d ed. 1872); THOMAS M. COo-
LEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 318 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868).
70 See, e.g., State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807); Finn v. Commonwealth, 26
Va. (5 Rand.) 701, 708 (1827).
71 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
72 Id. at 58.
7 Id. at 58-59.
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this allegation during a preliminary examination and was not sub-
jected to cross-examination. 74 Before trial, without any evidence of
foul play by either the prosecution or the defense, the witness moved
to another state and ceased all contact with her family and the defen-
dant.75 At trial, in lieu of her testimony, the prosecution introduced
the transcript of the preliminary examination in accordance with an
Ohio statute that permitted the admission of preliminary-examination
transcripts when witnesses were unavailable.76 The Court upheld the
admission of the transcript by interpreting the Confrontation Clause
narrowly, in light of "its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in
the factfinding process,"77 to permit the admission of uncross-ex-
amined testimony-or, to use the Court's Sixth Amendment jargon,
unconfronted testimony-when it "bears adequate indicia of reliabil-
ity."7 8 The Court thus interpreted the Confrontation Clause as a sub-
stantive guarantee of the underlying goal of cross-examination-
ensuring reliable testimony-rather than as a right to that procedure
itself.
The Court borrowed the "indicia of reliability" test from several
decisions that "conclud[ed] that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon
such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protec-
tion.' 7 9 In other words, the admission of unconfronted testimony
does not violate the Confrontation Clause if the testimony would be
admissible under traditional rules of evidence. The Court reasoned
that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment could not have intended to
constitutionalize the entire law of hearsay given that this ancient doc-
trine long predated the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Yet, this
line of reasoning reduced the right of confrontation to another rule
of evidence that might complement the law of hearsay but not super-
sede it. This approach is unique to the American right of confronta-
tion and is not present in other constitutional doctrines that limit
admissibility of certain evidence; for example, a defendant's confes-
sion, though admissible under well-established hearsay exceptions, is
inadmissible if obtained in violation of Miranda or coerced in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause. This conflation of the right of con-
frontation with the rules of evidence was the ultimate basis for
classifying all Confrontation Clause violations as trial errors, just as all
rules of evidence are subject to harmless error review.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 59.
77 Id. at 65.
78 Id. at 66 (internal quotation omitted).
79 Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
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C. Confrontation Clause Violations as Trial Errors
Thus, application of harmless error review was the natural conse-
quence of Roberts's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. The
Court has elsewhere recognized that substantive guarantees, unlike
procedural rights, generally must be subject to some inquiry into their
prejudicial impact before reversal is appropriate. For example, the
Court in Strickland v. Washington distinguished denial of the right to
the effective assistance of counsel-a trial error-from denial of the
right to counsel-a structural defect-by stressing that the very notion
of ineffective assistance presupposes that counsel did something that
rendered the trial unfair.80 That is, under the Court's analysis, the
question of whether the defendant was denied the right of effective
assistance of counsel cannot be meaningfully separated from the ques-
tion of whether counsel's failings harmed the defendant because inef-
fectiveness implies a failing that has actually harmed the defendant.81
Van Arsdall similarly characterized the Confrontation Clause as
conferring on defendants the "'right of effective cross-examination"'
and accordingly held that all Confrontation Clause violations were
trial errors.82 Van Arsdall presented relatively ideal facts for the appli-
cation of harmless error review. The defendant had been barred
from impeaching a prosecution witness through questioning about
the dismissal of an unrelated criminal charge in exchange for the wit-
ness's agreement to testify.8 3 Outside of the presence of the jury, the
witness admitted to the agreement but denied that it affected his testi-
mony.84 Van Ardsall recognized that the trial court unquestionably
erred in preventing the defendant from cross-examining the witness
on this point8 5 but did not reverse-the Court remanded because the
80 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-96 (1984). Because this decision
predated Fulminante, the Court does not expressly state that violations of the right to the
effective assistance of counsel are trial errors or that violations of the right to counsel are
structural defects. However, the Court does state, "In certain Sixth Amendment contexts,
prejudice is presumed," while "actual ineffectiveness claims . . . are subject to a general
requirement that the defendant affirmatively prove prejudice." Id. at 692-93. While this
standard imposes the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant, unlike the traditional
Chapman standard, it is clear from the Court's analysis that a reversal will be obtained only
if prejudice is proven and that a nonprejudicial, or harmless, error will not result in a
reversal. See id. at 693.
81 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006).
82 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682 (1986) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308, 318 (1974)). Although the Court had applied harmless error analysis to Confronta-
tion Clause violations prior to Van Arsdall in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 251-54
(1969); Schneble v. Rorida, 405 U.S. 427, 428-32 (1972); and Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 26-27 (1973), Van Arsdall was the first decision to broadly declare that "the denial of
the opportunity to cross-examine an adverse witness does not fit within the limited cate-
gory of constitutional errors that are deemed prejudicial in every case." 475 U.S. at 682.
83 Van Arsdal4 475 U.S. at 676.
84 Id. at 676-77.
85 Id. at 679.
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lower court had not addressed the harmlessness of the error.8 6 The
testimony at issue was purely cumulative, marginally relevant, and
questionably reliable given the witness's extreme state of intoxication
during the events at issue; the remainder of the prosecution's case, by
contrast, was quite strong.87
In requiring harmless error review for Confrontation Clause vio-
lations, Van Arsdall stressed that the core inquiry was whether the ad-
mission of evidence without proper cross-examination affected the
reliability of the fact-finding process.88 Naturally, the reliability of the
wrongfully admitted evidence will play a key role in this process, as the
wrongful admission of reliable evidence is not likely to adversely affect
the reliability of the proceeding. Van Arsdall also noted that several
other factors may also bear on the harmlessness determination, such
as "the importance of the witness' [sic] testimony in the prosecution's
case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence
of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the wit-
ness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise
permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's
case."69 With the exceptions of corroboration (which bears directly
on reliability) and the extent of cross-examination otherwise permit-
ted (from which the reliability of the witness on other matters may be
inferred), finding a Confrontation Clause violation harmless on the
basis of the secondary factors alone would require a reviewing court to
determine, in effect, that the prosecution could have satisfied its bur-
den even without the wrongfully admitted evidence either because the
remainder of its case was overwhelming or because the evidence at
issue was unimportant or cumulative. Although such a finding is not
entirely uncommon, to date, only one court has suggested that these
secondary factors are more important that the primary goal of ensur-
ing reliability.90
D. Crawford: The End of the Roberts Era and the Refashioning of
the Confrontation Clause into a Procedural Right
A twenty-three years after its inception, the Roberts era ended with
Crawford. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, applied a
rigid originalist framework: "[T]he Framers would not have allowed
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a
86 Id. at 684.
87 Id. at 675-76.
88 Id. at 684.
89 Id.
90 See United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008).
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prior opportunity for cross-examination."91 Indeed, imposing an
originalist framework seemed more important to the Court than cor-
recting the substantive course of its prior jurisprudence: "Although
the results of our decisions have generally been faithful to the original
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same cannot be said of our
rationales."92
Crawford involved a prosecution for assault and attempted mur-
der.98 In Crawford, the defendant's spouse was barred from testifying
under Washington's marital-privilege rule.9 4 In lieu of the spouse's
testimony, the trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce a
tape-recorded statement that the spouse made to the police.9 5 Apply-
ing Roberts, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the admission of
the tape recording because "it bore guarantees of trustworthiness," as
the defendant's confession corroborated the recording.9 6 The United
States Supreme Court reversed and, in overruling Roberts, explained
that the determinative inquiry is no longer whether evidence bears
sufficient indicia of reliability but simply whether the defendant had
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness: "Where testimonial state-
ments are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy
constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes:
confrontation."9 7 However, the Court also narrowed the right of con-
frontation in one important respect: while Roberts applied to any out-
of-court statement introduced against the accused, Crawford held that
the Confrontation Clause applied primarily to "testimonial state-
ments,"98 a neologism the Court did not define until Davis v. Washing-
ton,99 when it explained that statements are testimonial when elicited
for "the primary purpose of ... establish [ing] or prov[ing] past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."100
91 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004).
92 Id. at 60.
93 Id. at 40.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 41-42.
97 Id. at 68-69.
98 Although Crawford did not explain to what extent the Confrontation Clause still
applied to nontestimonial statements, see id. at 53-54, the Court has subsequently clarified
that there is no constitutional right to confront the declarants of nontestimonial out-of-
court statements. See Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007). After Crawford but
before Bockting, courts had continued to apply Roberts to nontestimonial statements. See id.
99 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
100 Id. at 822.
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1. The Applicability of Harmless Error Review to Post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause Violations
a. The Supreme Court Has Declined to Directly Address Whether
Confrontation Clause Violations Remain Subject to
Harmless Error Review
Despite having dramatically refashioned the substantive scope of
the right of confrontation, the Crawford Court declined to address
whether harmless error review continued to apply to Confrontation
Clause violations, noting only in a footnote that it "express[ed] no
opinion" as to whether "the confrontation violation, if it occurred, was
not harmless."1 0 1 In United States v. Gonzalez-Lapez,102 however, the
Court was quick to compare violations of the newly fashioned right of
confrontation with a structural defect:
Since, it was argued, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to
ensure the reliability of evidence, so long as the testimonial hearsay
bore "indicia of reliability," the Confrontation Clause was not vio-
lated. We rejected that argument ... in Crawford . .. saying that the
Confrontation Clause "commands, not that evidence be reliable,
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in
the crucible of cross-examination."
So also with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.
It commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee
of fairness be provided . . . .0o
The Court went on to hold that the denial of the right to counsel of
choice was a structural defect because it "deffied] analysis by harm-
less-error standards."1 0 4
Gonzalez-Lopez's strong reading of Crawford notwithstanding,
Whorton v. Bockting'05 declined to apply Crawford retroactively in a col-
lateral review of a pre-Crawford conviction. For a new procedural rule
announced in a decision of the Supreme Court to apply retroactively
in a collateral proceeding, the rule must be either substantive or "a
watershed rule of criminal procedure implicating the fundamental
fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding."10 6 To qualify as
watershed, a new rule of criminal procedure must be "necessary to
prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction" and
"alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essen-
tial to the fairness of a proceeding."1 0 7 To date, the Supreme Court
101 541 U.S. at 42 n.I.
102 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
10 Id. at 146 (citations omitted).
104 Id. at 148 (quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991)) (internal
punctuation omitted).
105 549 U.S. 406, 416, 421 (2007).
106 Id. at 416 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
107 Id. at 418 (citations and internal punctuation omitted).
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has only acknowledged one rule that might have qualified for water-
shed status' 0 8-the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel first
recognized in Gideon v. Wainaright.'09 The Court distinguished Craw-
ford from Gideon on the ground that the "overall effect of Crawford" on
"the accuracy of factfinding in criminal cases is not easy to assess.""10
The Court noted that while Crawford is more restrictive than Roberts
with respect to testimonial statements and thus "may improve the ac-
curacy of factfinding in some criminal cases," Crawford eliminated
"Confrontation Clause protection against the admission of unreliable
out-of-court nontestimonial statements"; the Court was thus "unclear
whether Crawford, on the whole, decreased or increased the number
of unreliable out-of-court statements that may be admitted in criminal
trials.""' However, the Court did stress that the watershed exception
is "extremely narrow"1 12 and that it has rejected every claim that a new
rule qualifies as watershed, including rules that are structural in
nature.1 3
Ultimately, neither Gonzalez-Lopez nor Bockting establishes the
gravity of Confrontation Clause error. Despite being squarely
presented with the issue in at least two petitions for certiorari,114 the
Supreme Court has continued to refuse to directly answer the ques-
tion of whether post-Crawford Confrontation Clause violations are sub-
ject to harmless error review or automatic reversal."i5
b. Most Lower Federal Courts Have Continued to Apply Van
Arsdall Since Crawford
Despite Crawford, virtually all federal courts of appeals have con-
tinued to subject Confrontation Clause violations to harmless error
review." 6 It is not clear from these decisions whether lower courts
108 See id. at 419.
109 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
110 Bockting, 549 U.S. at 419.
I Id. at 419-20.
112 Id. at 417 (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
113 See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) (rejecting retroactivity for Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 358 (rejecting retroactivity for Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (rejecting
retroactivity for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508
U.S. 333, 335 (1993) (rejecting retroactivity for Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.
1990)); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 229 (1990) (rejecting retroactivity for Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985)).
114 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abu Ali, supra note 24, at 13; Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Shisinday, supra note 24, at 12.
115 See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2542 n.14 (2009) ("We of
course express no view as to whether the [Confrontation Clause violation] was harmless.").
116 The following cases, grouped by circuit courts of appeals, have subjected Confron-
tation Clause violations to harmless error review:
* First Circuit: United States v. Earle, 488 F.3d 537, 545-46 (2007); United
States v. Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 18 (2004).
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believe that Crawford and its progeny implicitly mandate application of
harmlessness analysis, as Chief Justice Rehnquist intoned, or simply
adhere to Van Ardsall in the absence of any express indication that
Crawford might have undermined it. With the exception of cases in
which the prosecution's evidence was overwhelming" 7 or extremely
weak,118 these decisions have focused on whether the evidence admit-
ted in violation of the Confrontation Clause was ultimately reliable, 119
although courts rarely make it clear on which factors of the mul-
tifactor Van Arsdall test they rely.
2. Several Lower-Court Decisions Suggesting that Especially Egregious
Confrontation Clause Violations May Amount to Structural
Defects
Several courts have apparently rejected Van Arsdall's blanket ap-
plication of harmless error review to all Confrontation Clause viola-
tions. Instead, before deciding whether to apply harmless error
review, these decisions first examine whether (1) the defendant would
have been in a position to affect the trial had the violation not oc-
curred and (2) the confrontation right was violated at a fundamental
level. 120 Under this framework, three state supreme courts held that
fundamental violations of the Confrontation Clause were structural
* Second Circuit: United States v. Anson, 304 F. App'x 1, 5 (2008); United
States v. Santos, 449 F.3d 93, 95 (2006).
* Third Circuit: United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 77-79 (2008); Al-
brecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 134-36 (2007).
* Fourth Circuit: United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 741-42 (2007).
* Fifth Circuit: United States v. Zheng Xiao Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 634-35
(2006); Miller v. Dretke, 404 F.3d 908, 918 (2005).
* Sixth Circuit: Hawkins v. Ganshimer, 286 F. App'x 896, 904-05 (2008);
United States v. Robinson, 389 F.3d 582, 593 (2004).
* Seventh Circuit: United States v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 887 (2004).
* Eighth Circuit: Bobadilla v. Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 793 (2009).
* Ninth Circuit: United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1107-08 (2007)
(en banc); United States v. Nielsen, 371 F.3d 574, 581-82 (2004).
* Tenth Circuit: United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1303-04 (2005).
* Eleventh Circuit: Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1338-39
(2006).
117 See, e.g., Banks, 482 F.3d at 742 (basing guilt upon, inter alia, revealed firsthand
knowledge of the alleged crimes, multiple pieces of physical evidence, and several sets of
fingerprints).
118 See, e.g., Bobadilla, 575 F.3d at 793.
119 See, e.g., Zheng, 460 F.3d at 634-35 (noting that the witness spoke directly to her
own knowledge and that other physical evidence corroborated the testimony).
120 See Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2001) (exclusion of defendant
from in-chambers hearing was structural error); Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138, 1144-45 (9th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding the defendant's exclusion from the announcement of the
verdict subject to harmless error review because the defendant had little role to play at that
point); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding the exclusion of defen-
dant from reading the trial transcript back to the jury subject to harmless error review
because the ability of the defendant to influence the process at that point was negligible).
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defects requiring automatic reversal.121 The United States Supreme
Court, however, has not revisited the differentiation between struc-
tural defects and trial errors.
II
UNTIL COMPLETE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATIONS ARE
RECOGNIZED AS STRUCTURAL DEFECTS, CRAWFORD
WILL BE REDUCED To ROBERTS ON APPEAL
If all Confrontation Clause violations continue to remain subject
to harmless error review, Crawford has created a right without a rem-
edy. Because the core concern of harmless error review is reliability,
appellate courts will not reverse convictions for violations of the Con-
frontation Clause when the wrongfully admitted evidence is suffi-
ciently reliable. Thus, to determine whether the Confrontation
Clause has been violated under Crawford, appellate courts will have to
make the same reliability assessments trial courts were to make under
Roberts, and as a result, only violations of both Roberts and Crawford will
result in a reversal of the underlying conviction.
In the short term, the limited procedural scope of the right of
confrontation will cause appellate courts to limit the de facto substan-
tive scope of the right to the confines of Roberts. It is possible that
conscientious trial courts might strictly adhere to the letter of Crawford
and exclude unconfronted testimonial evidence. However, in the
long term, trial courts will lose any incentive to enforce the letter of
Crawford, and prosecutors will have every reason to attempt to intro-
duce unconfronted testimonial evidence because any consequent
Confrontation Clause violations will not result in a reversal of the con-
viction unless the evidence is also unreliable. This situation will leave
defendants without any means of enforcing the constitutional rights
that Crawford guarantees them. If the Supreme Court is at all inter-
ested in protecting the substantive scope of the Confrontation Clause,
it must provide means of remedying Confrontation Clause violations
that will also prevent the future admission of unconfronted testimony.
As an alternative method for enforcing defendants' rights, Jen-
nifer Laurin has suggested making civil remedies available to a defen-
dant whose right of confrontation was violated.'22 Such a sea change
in current practice, however, is unlikely and would not necessarily
121 See State v. Garcia-Contreras, 953 P.2d 536, 540-41 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc) (holding
that the defendant's exclusion from the jury-selection process was a structural defect);
State v. Calderon, 13 P.3d 871, 878-79 (Kan. 2000) (holding that the failure to provide a
translator during closing arguments was a structural defect); State v. Bird, 43 P.3d 266,
269-72 (Mont. 2002) (classifying defendant's exclusion from in-charnbers individual voir
dire proceedings as a structural defect).
122 SeeJennifer E. Laurin, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Hous-
ton, and Remedial Rationing, 109 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 82, 83 (2009).
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cure the problems of harmless error review. The potential dignitary
harms arising from a violation of the right of confrontation would be
difficult to prove and even more challenging to quantitatively assess.
Furthermore, even if such damages were available, this result would
be cold comfort to the defendant who must nevertheless remain incar-
cerated or otherwise punished. Thus, regardless of the form of the
remedy, the Court must treat at least some Confrontation Clause vio-
lations as structural errors to prevent the right of confrontation from
collapsing again into a mere right to reliable testimony. The remain-
der of this Part examines the structure of contemporary harmless er-
ror review and how lower courts have applied harmlessness analysis in
the Confrontation Clause context, concluding that, in fact, courts
have already begun to reduce the scope of the Crawford-era Confronta-
tion Clause to its Roberts-era limits.
A. The Primary Objective of Harmless Error Review
The harmless error doctrine arises from "the principle that the
central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of
the defendant's guilt or innocence." 123 Harmless error analysis evalu-
ates whether an error is "harmless" in terms of its "effect on the
factfinding process at trial." 1 24 Accordingly, in the Confrontation
Clause context, the harmless error inquiry focuses on whether the
wrongfully admitted evidence "might have affected the reliability" of
the proceeding.12 5 The Supreme Court has also stressed that a secon-
dary, but nonetheless important, purpose of harmless error review is
to "promote[ ] public respect for the criminal process by focusing on
the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevita-
ble presence of immaterial error."1 26 Although the Court has never
indicated how this secondary consideration might affect harmless er-
ror review, it further evidences the Court's concern about the fairness
of the criminal trial, which is necessarily implicated when the reliabil-
ity of the trial process is diminished.
The Second Circuit has suggested that contemporary Confronta-
tion Clause harmless error jurisprudence has shifted from a focus on
reliability to a focus on assessing the strength of the remaining evi-
dence of guilt. In effect, this shift would reduce the inquiry to a deter-
mination of whether the remainder of the prosecution's case was
123 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citing United States v. Nobles,
422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975)); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991).
124 Van Arsdall 475 U.S. at 681.
125 Id. at 684.
126 Id. at 681 (citing ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 50 (1970)
("Reversal for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse
the judicial process and bestirs the public to ridicule it.")).
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sufficient to meet its burden. 1 2 7 This approach potentially means that
even the most prejudicial errors would not result in reversal if the fact
finder could have found the defendant guilty based on the remaining
evidence. The court identified Harrington v. California128 and Schneble
v. Florida 29 as evidence of this shift. Although both of these decisions
apply harmless error review to Confrontation Clause violations, they
predate Van Arsdall, which states that the primary goal of harmless
error analysis is to gauge the effect of the violation on the reliability of
the proceeding.130 The Second Circuit does not explain why only one
of the secondary Van Arsdall factors should be prioritized over all of
the other factors. Moreover, if the prosecution's case sufficiently
meets its burden even absent the wrongfully admitted evidence, this
showing can be equated to a form of indirect corroboration; because
the defendant in these instances is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
evidence supporting the defendant's guilt must be, to some degree,
accurate. To date, other circuit courts do not appear to have followed
the Second Circuit's approach.
B. Reducing the Confrontation Right to Its Roberts-Era Scope
This Note suggests that while the de jure substantive scope of the
right of confrontation-at least with respect to testimonial state-
ments-has expanded in the wake of Crawford, the de facto scope
largely remains unchanged. To test this hypothesis, this Note has
identified two core distinctions between Crawford and Roberts. First,
under Roberts, evidence is admitted solely on the basis of a judicial-
reliability assessment, while under Crawford the determinative inquiry
is whether there was a prior opportunity for cross-examination.131
Second, under Roberts, out-of-court confessions of accomplices are
routinely admitted, while the Crawford Court made clear that the Con-
frontation Clause means to exclude them. 13 2 This subpart defines
these core distinctions and examines whether lower courts have pre-
served them, concluding that the distinctions between the two deci-
sions collapse under harmless error review.
1. The Reemergence of Judicial Reliability Assessments in the
Crawford Era
Under Roberts, a trial court could admit unconfronted testimonial
evidence if it manifested "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
127 See United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 199 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 2 STEVEN
ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 7.03 (3d ed. 1999)).
128 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
129 405 U.S. 427, 432 (1972).
130 Van Arsdall 475 U.S. at 684.
131 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
132 See id. at 63-64.
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ness."' 3 3 If the trial court determined that the evidence bore suffi-
cient indicia of reliability, the court could admit the evidence upon a
showing that the source of the testimony was unavailable, ignoring
whether the defendant had any opportunity to cross-examine the de-
clarant at the time the statement was made.134 Only the court needed
to be satisfied of the evidence's reliability.135 Under Crawford, the trial
court makes no reliability determination; instead, reliability is assessed
"by testing in the crucible of cross-examination." 3 6 That is, the Con-
stitution is interpreted to mandate that a particular procedure be em-
ployed in assessing reliability, not that reliability itself be
guaranteed.13 7 Crawford emphasized this point by highlighting that
the judicial-reliability assessments permitted by Roberts were precisely
the sort of ex parte proceedings that infamously characterized Sir Wal-
ter Raleigh's case' 38 and several other notorious English prosecu-
tions.139 The Court noted that the prosecution in Sir Walter Raleigh's
case employed many of the same arguments a court applying Roberts
might have invoked: that the statements were self-inculpatory, 14 0 not
made in the heat of passion,141 and not obtained upon any promise of
a pardonl42-in other words, that they bore particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.
As a result of the application of harmless error review to viola-
tions of the Confrontation Clause, the amorphous Roberts test has re-
surfaced as the de facto rule for assessing harmfulness. This result has
come about because the primary inquiry in the harmless error review
of confrontation violations is whether the evidence affected the relia-
bility of the proceeding.143 The most straightforward means for an
133 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
134 See id.
135 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
136 Id. at 61.
137 Id.
138 Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 63, at 15-16, 24 (admitting an accomplice's
letter and testimony before the Privy Council without any prior opportunity for the defen-
dant to cross-examine the accomplice).
139 See, e.g., John Lilburn, The Trial of John Lilburn and John Wharton, for Printing and
Publishing Seditious Books. In the Star-Chamber: 13 Charles I. A.D. 1637, in 3 COBBETT'S COM-
PLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1315, 1318-22 (London, R. Bagshaw 1809) .(admitting an out-
of-court accusation of seditious publication without recourse to cross-examine the declar-
ant); The Trial of Sir Nicholas Throcknorton, knight, in the Guildhall of London, for High Treason:
1 Mary, April 17, 1554, in 1 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PRO-
caDiNGs FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 869, 875-77 (London,
R. Bagshaw 1809) (admitting the prior examination of a witness in lieu of live testimony
without any prior opportunity for cross-examination).
140 Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, supra note 63, at 19.
141 Id. at 14.
142 Id. at 29.
143 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).
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appellate court to make this determination is to examine the record
for particularized guarantees of the evidence's trustworthiness. If
some means other than cross-examination guaranteed the evidence's
reliability, cross-examination could not have significantly improved
the reliability of the proceeding, and thus the denial of the defen-
dant's right of confrontation is harmless. But "[a]dmitting statements
deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation" 4 4 even when the goal of the judicial inquiry is the
same as that of cross-examination.14 5
Roberts-style reliability assessments have begun to emerge in the
post-Crawford decisional law of the Courts of Appeals. In United States
v. Earle,146 a prosecution of a deported alien for illegal reentry, the
First Circuit held that the admission of a Certificate of Nonexistence
of a Record-a document stating that there was no record the defen-
dant had filed the form required for legal reentry of a deportee-was
a harmless error without permitting the defendant to cross-examine
the preparer of the form.1 4 7 The court held that the opportunity to
cross-examine the preparer's subordinate would have rendered any
testimony by the preparer purely cumulative-implicitly assuming
that the subordinate and preparer were equally reliable witnesses de-
spite the defense's protestations to the contrary-and therefore would
not have affected the reliability of the proceeding. 48 The North Car-
olina Court of Appeals similarly held the admission of a drug-test lab
report a harmless error where a supervisor testified about procedures
and equipment but the testing analyst did not testify.149 In United
States v. Anson,150 a prosecution for the transport and possession of
child pornography, the Second Circuit held that the admission of
hearsay statements about the "ages and geographic location of the
children depicted" was harmless, in part because "the officers could
have testified to the ages of the children based on their direct observa-
tion of the children or on their inspection of the relevant birth certifi-
cates or other documentary evidence."151 In effect, the court made a
determination that the hearsay statements must be reliable because
the officers' knowledge of other facts implicitly corroborated the
statements.
144 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
145 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shisinday, supra note 24, at 21.
146 488 F.3d 537 (1st Cir. 2007).
147 Id. at 546.
148 Id. at 546 n.12; see also United States v. Madarikan, 356 F. App'x 532, 535 (2d Cir.
2009) (finding an error under Melendez-Diaz to admit a Certificate of Nonexistence of Re-
cord without opportunity to cross-examine the preparer but holding the error harmless
due to defendant's admission that she had not filed the requisite form).
149 State v. Galindo, 683 S.E.2d 785, 787-89 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
150 304 F. App'x 1 (2d Cir. 2008).
151 Id. at 5.
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Furthermore, in United States v. fimenez,15 2 the Third Circuit up-
held the defendants' bank-fraud convictions, obtained in part
through the admission of several bank statements as business records,
despite the defendants having no opportunity to cross-examine the
custodian of records. 53 The court noted that the written declarations
of the records custodian stated that the bank statements were created
at or near the time that the matters contained in the statements oc-
curred, that the statements were made and kept in the course of the
regularly conducted activities of the bank, and that any duplicates
were accurate copies of the originals.15 4 The court repeatedly stressed
that the defendants never challenged the accuracy of these declara-
tions.'5 5 The admission of the statements thus appears to have been
predicated on their reliability, as determined by the Third Circuit,
rather than on the extent to which the defendants had an opportunity
to cross-examine the custodian. The Fifth Circuit in Miller v. Dretke156
held that the admission of a codefendant's incriminating extrajudicial
confession was harmless error, in part because the defendant had an
opportunity to cross-examine another witness "whose testimony cor-
roborated [the] confession."15 7 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that
the admission of a tape-recorded statement by a nontestifying code-
fendant was harmless error because of "independent circumstantial
proof' and corroboration from another witness.158
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a district court's refusal to
permit a defendant to cross-examine a cooperating witness about the
mandatory-minimum life sentence the witness faced in the absence of
cooperation was harmless error. The court so held in part because
the defendant was permitted to explore the witness's criminal past
and general desire to obtain a lesser sentence and because the court
instructed the jury to treat cooperating witnesses "with greater cau-
tion"-in effect, a finding that the testimony bore adequate indicia of
reliability.' 5 9
152 513 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2008).
153 Id. at 77-79. The court did not address whether the admission of the bank state-
ments violated the Confrontation Clause but only stated that if the statements did violate
the Confrontation Clause, their admission was harmless. Melendez-Diaz now establishes that
business records are nontestimonial and therefore not subject to the Confrontation
Clause. See 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2009).
154 Jimenez, 513 F.3d at 78.
155 Id. at 78-79.
156 404 F.3d 908 (5th Cir. 2005).
157 Id. at 918.
158 Hawkins v. Ganshimer, 286 F. App'x 896, 904 (6th Cir. 2008).
159 United States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1108 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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2. The Effect of the Application of Harmless Error Analysis to a
Crawford Confrontation Clause Violation
Crawford also stressed that the Confrontation Clause was "plainly
meant to exclude" the out-of-court confessions of accomplices. 160
Under Roberts, however, courts routinely admitted them.1 6 ' The Court
attributed this error to the amorphous and unpredictable nature of
the Roberts test, noting that its applications were often flatly inconsis-
tent. 162 For example, the Court in Crawford stated that
the Colorado Supreme Court held a statement more reliable be-
cause itsr inculpation of the defendant was "detailed," while the
Fourth Circuit found a statement more reliable because the portion
implicating another was "fleeting." The Virginia Court of Appeals
found a statement more reliable because the witness was in custody
and charged with a crime... , while the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
found a statement more reliable because the witness was not in cus-
tody and not a suspect. Finally, the Colorado Supreme Court in one
case found a statement more reliable because it was given "immedi-
ately after" the events at issue, while that same court, in another
case, found a statement more reliable because two years had
elapsed.16 3
After Crawford, several appellate courts have held that the admis-
sions of accomplices' or agents' inculpatory statements were harmless
error. 64 In Grossman v. McDonough,165 the Eleventh Circuit held the
160 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63-64 (2004).
161 See, e.g., United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 245-46
(4th Cir. 2001); People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406-08 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); People v.
Lawrence, 55 P.3d 155, 160-61 (Colo. App. 2001); People v. Thomas, 730 N.E.2d 618,
625-26 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 63 S.W.3d 151, 166-68 (Ky. 2001);
People v. Schutte, 613 N.W.2d 370, 376-77 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Hawkins, 2002-
Ohio-7347U, at 1f 63-75, abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; State v. Marshall, 737 N.E.2d
1005, 1009 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); State v. Jones, 15 P.3d 616, 623-25 (Or. Ct. App. 2000);
State v. Bintz, 2002 WI App 204, 1 8-14, 257 Wis. 2d 177, 650 N.W.2d 913. Courts have
also invoked Roberts to admit a small number of other plainly testimonial statements. See,
e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 295 F.3d 1018, 1021-23 (9th Cir. 2002) (plea allocution show-
ing existence of a conspiracy); United States v. Thomas, 30 F. App'x 277, 279 (4th Cir.
2002) (grandjury testimony); United States v. Centracchio, 265 F.3d 518, 527-30 (7th Cir.
2001) (plea allocution showing existence of a conspiracy); United States v. Dolah, 245 F.3d
98, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); United States v. Petrillo, 237 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir.
2000) (same); United States v. Moskowitz, 215 F.3d 265, 268-69 (2d Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (same); United States v. Papajohn, 212 F.3d 1112, 1118-20 (8th Cir. 2000) (grand
jury testimony); United States v. Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 166-68 (2d Cir. 1999) (plea allocu-
tion showing existence of a conspiracy); State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-24 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2000) (prior trial testimony).
162 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
163 Id. (emphases and citations omitted).
164 But see id. at 63-64 (citing as a prime example of the "unpardonable vice" of Roberts
the decisional law permitting the introduction of out-of-court accomplice confessions it
inspired).
165 466 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2006).
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admission of an accomplice's confession to a detective a harmless er-
ror in part because the confession duplicated prior inculpatory state-
ments the defendant had made to three other private parties, each of
whom testified at trial.'66 The Fifth Circuit similarly upheld the ad-
mission of the out-of-court statements of the defendant's employee in
part because the employee "spoke directly to her own knowledge" and
because the statements were "corroborated by other evidence."' 6 7
Thus, even the most flagrant violations of the Confrontation Clause
will go without remedy if a court ultimately finds that the evidence
introduced was reliable.
Not only have Roberts-style judicial-reliability determinations
reemerged, but courts that are perhaps ill equipped to do so now de-
cide the question of whether evidence is sufficiently reliable to pass
constitutional muster. More importantly, however, is how harmless er-
ror review affects the substantive scope of the Crawford-era Confronta-
tion Clause. Harmless error review will only require a reversal when a
Crawford error would also have been a Roberts error. As a result, courts
on appeal will undo whatever expanded protections Crawford may
have granted defendants. These protections are constitutional crimi-
nal-procedure rights, which a criminal remedy should vindicate. In
the long run, these decisions will reduce the incentive of trial courts
to follow the letter of Crawford as they will only suffer reversal if the
error would have amounted to an error under Roberts. If the Supreme
Court does not soon revisit Van Arsdall, Crawford may become a dead
letter.
III
TREATING EGREGIOUs VIOLATIONS OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE AS STRUCTURAL DEFECTS IS CONSONANT WITH
CONTEMPORARY SixTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Although the doctrine that Confrontation Clause violations are
subject to harmless error review is arguably forty years old168 and has
been uncontested for nearly twenty-five years,' 6 9 Crawford's refash-
ioning of the right of confrontation into a procedural guarantee ne-
cessitates its reconsideration. Crawford situates the Confrontation
Clause in a broader theory of the Sixth Amendment as a set of funda-
mental procedural rights intended to prevent the evils of an inquisito-
rial system.17 0 Under this anti-inquisitorial framework, the right of
confrontation merits strong protection because it lies at the core of
166 Id. at 1340.
167 United States v. Zheng Xiao Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 634-35 (5th Cir. 2006).
168 See Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
169 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 674 (1986).
170 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
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what it means for a criminal trial to be adversarial.' 7 1 In light of the
recognition of the right of confrontation as a core procedural right,
courts should treat complete violations of the Confrontation Clause as
structural defects.
The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has long
suffered from confusion about whether the primary goal of the Sixth
Amendment is to guarantee a fair and reliable trial overall or to man-
date certain specific trial procedures. 172 In the decades preceding
Crawford, the Court generally interpreted the Sixth Amendment with
the primary goal of promoting verdict accuracy.' 73 Since Crawford,
however, the Court has largely recast the Sixth Amendment primarily
as a set of procedural rights designed to prevent the perceived evils of
an inquisitorial system.17 4 This shift regarding the goals of the Sixth
Amendment further necessitates revisiting Van Arsdall.
A. The Effect of the Disentanglement of the Reliability and Anti-
Inquisitorial Theories of the Sixth Amendment on
Contemporary Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence
By adopting an anti-inquisitorial theory of the Confrontation
Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that the procedure of
cross-examination itself, not simply the goal of verdict accuracy, must
be protected. Sanjay Chhablani locates the emergence of reliability as
a consideration in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Mattox v.
United States.'75 In Mattox, the Court admitted the prior testimony of
two deceased witnesses when the defendant had had a prior opportu-
nity to cross-examine them based on "considerations of public policy
and the necessities of the case."' 76 However, it was not until Dutton v.
Evans'77 that reliability became the predominant goal of the Confron-
tation Clause,178 and a majority of the Court did not explicitly accept
this predominance until Roberts.179
171 See id. at 43, 50-51.
172 See Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling the Sixth Amendment, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487,
488-90 (2009) (examining the roles and attractiveness of anti-inquisitorialism in American
criminal process and law); see also Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1643-56 (examining the oper-
ation of anti-inquisitorialism under the Supreme Court's reinterpretation of the Confron-
tation Clause).
173 See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,86 (1970);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); YALE KAMISAR ET AL,., MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1429 (12th ed. 2008); Chhablani, supra note
172, at 513.
174 See Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1642-44.
175 156 U.S. 237 (1895); see Chhablani, supra note 172, at 513.
176 156 U.S. at 243.
17 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
178 SeeJohn G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examina-
tion, and the Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 191, 202-03 (1999).
17 See Chhablani, supra note 172, at 513-14.
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Chhablani, relying on Justice Clarence Thomas's concurrence in
White v. Illinois,180 argues that the priority of reliability in the Court's
pre-Crawford Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was "inconsistent
with the text and history of the Clause" and that reliability "is more
properly a due process concern." 8 1 In other words, Sixth Amend-
ment jurisprudence had become entangled with the reliability norms
of due process.182 Crawford, in rejecting this approach, emphasized
that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed
was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure" rather than the reliabil-
ity of fact-finding in criminal cases.18 3 David Alan Sklansky argues that
Crawford is thus best understood as a component of a broader pro-
gram by the Court to reframe constitutional criminal procedure as a
set of rights designed to protect the adversarial process from the evils
of inquisitorialism.184 Thus, because the Court "takes prosecution of a
criminal defendant through the use of statements taken in his ab-
sence to be a signal feature of the inquisitorial system," the Court has
read the Confrontation Clause expansively, emphasizing that exami-
nation of witnesses must follow the constitutionally prescribed proce-
dure.183 The Court's extensive discussion in Crawford of the role
played by ex parte examinations in the 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh bolsters this reading of Crawford;186 the Court declared em-
phatically that " [t] he common-law tradition is one of live testimony in
court subject to adversarial testing, while the civil law condones exami-
nation in private by judicial officers."' 87
The Court's subsequent jurisprudence has only further expanded
the scope of the anti-inquisitorial theory of the Confrontation Clause.
Davis v. Washington'88 held that statements made during police inter-
rogation are testimonial and that the Confrontation Clause may bar
these statements because they bear a "striking resemblance" to civil
law ex parte examinations.1 8 9 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts held that
the admission of a certificate of analysis stating that the substance
found on the defendant was cocaine without providing the defendant
an opportunity to cross-examine the forensic analyst that prepared the
certificate violated the Confrontation Clause, in part because the cer-
tificates resembled affidavits, part of the "core class of testimonial
180 502 U.S. 346, 358 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).
181 Chhablani, supra note 172, at 514-15 (quoting White, 502 U.S. at 358, 363-64
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
182 See id.
183 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004).
184 See Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1635.
185 Id. at 1652-53.
186 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
187 Id. at 43.
188 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
189 Id. at 830 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52).
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statements."190 The Court analogized the case to Kirby v. United
States,'91 where the Court overturned a conviction for stolen property
because part of the evidence consisted of the records of conviction of
the three individuals who had stolen the property.19 2 Although, much
like in Melendez-Diaz, the documents did not prove the defendant's
guilt, the Court nevertheless ruled that the admission of the records
violated the Confrontation Clause.193 The Court recently reaffirmed
its holding in Melendez-Diaz by summarily reversing a decision of the
Supreme Court of Virginia that upheld the admission of a certificate
of forensic-laboratory analysis without the production of the analyst
where state law permitted the defendant to subpoena the analyst.194
B. The Anti-Inquisitorialist Theory of the Sixth Amendment
Applied to Harmless Error Review
The determinative inquiry in harmless error review is whether the
constitutional violation has affected the reliability of the proceed-
ing.195 This reliability-focused inquiry is consonant with the Roberts
approach to the right of confrontation; however, it is fundamentally at
odds with the Court's current theory of the Confrontation Clause,
which is now framed entirely in terms of the importance of preserving
the integrity of the adversarial process, irrespective of its overall effect
on the trial's reliability.19 6 If, as Crawford suggests, the core evil of the
denial of the right of confrontation is the corruption of the adver-
sarial process, it is unclear why the reliability of the wrongfully admit-
ted evidence or, for that matter, the strength of the prosecution's case
or any of the other secondary Van Arsdall factors are at all relevant in
assessing the harmfulness of the constitutional violation. The viola-
tion subsists in the denial of the defendant's right to assess the reliabil-
ity of the evidence introduced against her or him to her or his
satisfaction. Once a judicial-reliability determination replaces the
cross-examination, the violation is complete. Much as the violation of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is "'complete' when
the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by
the lawyer he wants,"197 so too should the Court recognize that once a
judge's assessment of reliability takes the place of any cross-examina-
190 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).
191 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
192 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534 (discussing Kirby, 174 U.S. at 53).
193 Id. at 2542.
194 Magruder v. Commonwealth, 657 S.E.2d 113, 120-21 (Va. 2008), vacated and re-
manded sub nom. Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (per curiam).
195 See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); see also supra Part II.B.1.
196 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62-68 (2004) (criticizing the Roberts test
for its unpredictability, amorphousness, and subjectivity).
197 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006).
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tion, the violation of the Confrontation Clause is complete and the
Court should not further inquire into the harmfulness of the error.
C. Complete Violations of the Confrontation Clause as a
Structural Defect Under Fulminante
Under the contemporary trial-error/structural-defect framework,
the Supreme Court should consider complete Confrontation Clause
violations to be structural defects. In Fulminante, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the Court on this issue only, attempted to develop a
coherent test for distinguishing between trial errors and structural de-
fects. Trial errors, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, are errors "which
occur[ ] during the presentation of the case to the jury."198 Structural
defects, by contrast, "affect[ ] the framework within which the trial
proceeds."199 Although these general principles are relatively clear,
the application of this test remains mysterious. For example, denial of
the right to trial by jury by giving a defective reasonable-doubt instruc-
tion is a structural defect.2 00 However, a jury instruction containing
an erroneous conclusive 20' or rebuttable presumption, 202 a jury in-
struction misstating an element of the offense, 203 or a total failure to
instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence 204 are all trial er-
rors. The arbitrariness of this test in practice highlights the need to
end the era of classifying certain rights violations as always trial errors
or always structural defects and recognizing that certain rights may be
violated in both trivial and egregious ways.
D. Complete Confrontation Clause Violations as Structural
Defects
A core concern in Sixth Amendment structural defect jurispru-
dence is the difficulty in hypothesizing how a trial might have pro-
ceeded in absence of the defect. Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez, in holding that
the denial of the Sixth Amendment right of counsel of choice is a
structural defect, stressed that "[i] t is impossible to know what differ-
ent choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quan-
tify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the
proceedings."205 Although this concern may not entirely explain why
the denial of the right of counsel of choice is a structural defect, it at
least explains why harmless error analysis in this context would be a
198 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307 (1991).
199 Id. at S10.
200 See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278-82 (1993).
201 See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989).
202 See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-80 (1986).
203 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501-04 (1987).
204 See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789-90 (1979).
205 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006).
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futile, purely speculative inquiry.206 Gonzalez-Lopez also rejects a pro-
posed reliability-based definition of the Sixth Amendment right of
counsel of choice, relying largely on Crawford.207 In other words, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel gives defendants, rather than
courts, control over the procedure to select counsel, just as the Con-
frontation Clause gives defendants control over the procedure by
which the reliability of evidence is assessed. 208 And although Bockting
made it clear that Crawford was not applicable retroactively, the narrow
exception permitting the retroactive application of new rules of crimi-
nal procedure applies only to rules that remedy "an impermissibly
large risk of an inaccurate conviction."2 0 9 The exclusive concern in
the retroactivity context was reliability, which does not appear to play
such a dominant role in trial-error/structural-defect jurisprudence.
Relying in part on Gonzalez-Lopez, the petitioner in Shisinday v.
Quarterman argued that Crawford requires reconsideration of Van Ar-
sdall.210 Shisinday argued that "the confrontation of testimony in-
volves an exchange in court whose outcome is unpredictable."2 1 1
Thus, similar to Gonzalez-Lopez, harmless error review is purely specula-
tive: "There is no way to reliably quantify or predict what would have
happened had petitioner not been deprived of his right to confront
and cross-examine .. . witness [es]."212 Moreover, the right of confron-
tation is more than simply a means of ensuring the correct result-"it
also is a reflection of the fundamental constitutional commitment to
treating a criminal defendant as someone who can affect the course of
his own trial."213 This point highlights another important commonal-
ity between the right of confrontation and the right of counsel of
choice: both protect the defendant's ability to exert some control over
the manner in which her or his trial proceeds. A substantial infringe-
ment on the right of confrontation certainly has the potential to affect
the framework within which the trial proceeds. The admission of a
transcript of a proceeding in lieu of the live testimony of a single wit-
ness may be an error in the presentation of the case to the jury. But if
the prosecution were to present the testimony of all its witnesses in the
form of tape-recorded monologues, the adversarial process itself
would be fundamentally undermined. Thus, at least some Confronta-
tion Clause violations have the potential to be structural defects.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 145-46.
208 Id. at 146.
209 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542
U.S. 348, 356 (2004)) (internal punctuation omitted).
210 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shisinday, supra note 24, at 17-23.
211 Id. at 18.
212 Id. at 19.
213 Id. at 20.
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Also relying on Gonzalez-Lopez, the petitioner in Abu Ali v. United
States similarly argued that the court should consider the presentation
of classified evidence to the jury-evidence to which the petitioner
and his counsel were denied access-a structural defect.214 In particu-
lar, the petitioner stressed the comparison drawn in Gonzalez-Lopez be-
tween the right of counsel of choice and the right of confrontation, as
both require "not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of
fairness be provided."215 The petitioner also argued that Van Arsdall
was inapposite because it "involved a matter the federal rules (and
common law) place firmly within the District Court's discretion-the
scope and extent of cross-examination," while the issue in Abu Ali con-
cerned a district court's "authority to pick and choose what evidence
admitted at trial the defendant will be permitted to see at all."2 1 6 Al-
though the Court denied certiorari in both Abu Ali217 and Shisinday,218
the Court has yet to explicitly affirm Van Arsdall since its decision in
Crawford.
E. The Erroneous Conflation of the Confrontation Clause with
Other Constitutional Rules of Evidentiary Admissibility
The Supreme Court's failure to recognize that egregious Con-
frontation Clause violations may be structural errors stems from its
treatment of the right of confrontation as a rule of evidentiary admis-
sibility rather than as the pure procedural right Crawford suggests it
ought to be.219 Most constitutional rules of evidentiary admissibility
are trial errors.220 However, Sklansky urges that the Supreme Court
look to the emerging confrontation jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) for guidance, noting that "the Euro-
pean confrontation right is very much a procedural right, not a rule of
evidentiary admissibility."22 1 Thus, the ECHR has little to say about
the admissibility of statements made by witnesses who are now dead,
focusing instead almost exclusively on protecting the defendant's abil-
ity to meaningfully participate in the trial process. 222
214 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Abu Ali, supra note 24, at 7, 17.
215 Id. at 17-18 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006)).
216 Id. at 22-23.
217 Abu Ali v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009).
218 Shisinday v. Quarternan, 129 S. Ct. 62 (2008).
219 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004); Sklansky, supra note 32, at
1693.
220 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 40.
221 Sklansky, supra note 32, at 1693. Sklansky also criticizes the ECHR for its very
strong harmless error rule. Id.
222 See P.S. v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 20, 2001), http://www.
echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/HUDOC/HUDOC+database (follow
"HUDOC Database" hyperlink; then search for "P.S. v. Germany"; then follow "Case of P.S.
v. Germany" hyperlink) (finding a violation of the right of confrontation when police of-
ficers but not magistrates have questioned victims of child sexual abuse); Saidi v. France,
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Elsewhere in the criminal-procedure context, the Court has con-
flated rights that require the exclusion of certain evidence with mere
rules of evidence. For example, the Court has long held that incrimi-
nating statements taken in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights
may nonetheless be used for the purposes of impeachment223 or as a
basis for further investigation.2 24 As one commentator has noted, "the
Court appears willing to overlook many technical violations of Mi-
randa if the search for truth is somehow aided."225 In effect, Miranda
is not treated like the Fourth Amendment right against searches and
seizures but more like the rule against hearsay: so long as the incrimi-
nating statements are only used for limited purposes (and not the
truth of their contents), they are admissible.
The right of confrontation's even greater similarity to the rule
against hearsay has led the Court to further conflate the two. If the
right of confrontation were no more than a rule of evidentiary admis-
sibility, a harmless error rule would be sensible because the general
goal of restrictions on the admissibility of evidence is to prevent un-
due prejudice to the litigants.226 But Crawford suggests that the right
of confrontation protects a more basic, procedural right of defend-
ants to actively participate in the trial process.227 If the Court is seri-
ous about creating a genuine procedural right, it cannot continue to
permit this right to be wholly undermined by subjecting it to harmless
error review.
IV
COMPLETE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATIONS SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED STRucruIRAL DEFECTS
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court should treat com-
plete Confrontation Clause violations as structural defects, while par-
tial Confrontation Clause violations should remain subject to harmless
error review. A complete Confrontation Clause violation occurs when
there is a total lack of any opportunity to cross-examine a witness or
witnesses. Thus, the introduction of a witness's prerecorded state-
ment to the police in lieu of her or his live testimony or the forcible
expulsion of the defendant and defense counsel from the courtroom
during a witness's testimony would amount to a complete Confronta-
261 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 40, 55-57 (1993) (finding a violation of the right of confronta-
tion when informants have been questioned but their identities were not disclosed to the
defense); Kostovski Case, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19-20 (1989) (same).
223 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
224 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 451-52 (1974).
225 Thomas P. Windom, Note, The Writing on the Wall: Miranda's "Prior Criminal Experi-
ence" Exception, 92 VA. L. REv. 327, 348 (2006).
226 See THOMAS BucKLEs, LAws OF EVIDENCE 20 (2003).
227 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
[Vol. 96:397430
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATIONS
tion Clause violation. A partial Confrontation Clause violation occurs
when a defendant's opportunity to cross-examine a witness is unduly
restricted. Thus, for example, prohibiting the defendant from asking
whether the witness had received any offers in exchange for her or his
favorable testimony would amount to a partial Confrontation Clause
violation.
This distinction broadly tracks Fulminante's description of the dis-
tinction between structural defects and trial errors. Denying a defen-
dant any opportunity to cross-examine a witness alters the framework
within which the trial proceeds. At least for the duration of that wit-
ness's testimony, the trial no longer progresses with the typical adver-
sarial "give and take" between the two sides; instead, the prosecution
unilaterally presents evidence without contest from the defendant.
Moreover, when a defendant is not permitted to ask any questions, a
reviewing court can only guess how the cross-examination might have
proceeded. By contrast, when a defendant is merely limited in terms
of the questions she or he may ask, the adversarial character of the
proceeding is not equally disrupted. Moreover, a reviewing court may
more easily assess what questions the defendant might have asked, if
permitted, based on the questions that the defendant did, or at-
tempted to, ask.
When applying harmless error review to a partial Confrontation
Clause violation, the inquiry should not be whether the evidence, in
the court's opinion, is reliable. Rather, the inquiry should focus on
whether the questions that the defendant was permitted to ask and
the answers to those questions are, by themselves, adequate indicia of
reliability. That is, the question should be whether the defendant had
a meaningful opportunity to determine that the evidence was reliable
or to challenge its reliability. A reviewing court can sustain a convic-
tion obtained in violation of the Confrontation Clause only if it is con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the lower court gave the
defendant a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
A. Finding the Middle Ground: Resolving the Misalignment
Between the De Facto and De Jure Scope of the
Confrontation Clause
The only viable solution is one that treats some violations of the
Confrontation Clause as structural defects and other violations as trial
errors. Not all violations of the Confrontation Clause are structural
defects because many of them do not involve the substitution of ajudi-
cial determination of reliability for cross-examination. A court may
limit a defendant's cross-examination out of a concern for the dignity
of a victim or to prevent the needless waste of time. Trial courts
should be permitted to determine when defendants have had an ade-
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quate opportunity to challenge the reliability of the evidence and to
deny needless or harassing cross-examination. In some instances,
these courts might infringe on the Confrontation Clause, but these
technical violations should not merit a reversal when the defendant
already had an adequate cross-examination.
Complete Confrontation Clause violations should lead to auto-
matic reversals because they necessarily involve a substitution of ajudi-
cial determination of reliability for cross-examination, thus
implicating the core anti-inquisitorial concern of the Confrontation
Clause. The admission of testimonial statements without any cross-
examination affects the framework within which the trial proceeds in
two ways. First, and most immediately, it eliminates the normal "give
and take" of adversarial proceedings by silencing the defendant. Sec-
ond, it trivializes the defendant's role in the proceedings as an actor
that can affect the course of the trial. This disrespect for the defen-
dant suggests that the defendant's interests are worth only minimal
consideration, and it will likely color the trier of fact's perception of
the defendant. Although a Confrontation Clause violation may not
necessarily affect "[ti he entire conduct of the trial from beginning to
end,"2 28 Sullivan v. Louisiana229-in finding a structural. error in the
giving of a defective reasonable-doubt instruction-demonstrates that
a sufficiently grave constitutional violation may amount to a structural
defect even if it does not affect the whole of the trial.23 0 Lastly, apply-
ing a modified harmless error review to complete Confrontation
Clause violations would be trivial because there cannot be a meaning-
ful opportunity to cross-examine a witness if there is no opportunity to
cross-examine whatsoever.
There are several reasons for drawing the line at the complete
denial of any opportunity to cross-examine a witness or witnesses. A
defendant who is allowed to ask a witness only one question is no bet-
ter off than a defendant who cannot ask any questions. However,
should such an extreme case arise, it is extremely unlikely that a court
would sustain the conviction-finding a meaningful opportunity to
cross-examine in a single question is extremely improbable. Moreo-
ver, there is at least a symbolic value in asking one question: it demon-
strates that the defendant is still considered a participant in the trial
process, albeit to an extremely limited degree. Finally, drawing the
line here creates a clear rule that is easy for courts to follow.
228 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991).
229 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
230 Id. at 281-82.
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Three Ninth Circuit caseS23' and three state supreme courts232
have also suggested distinguishing between more and less severe Con-
frontation Clause violations and treating the more severe violations as
structural defects. However, these decisions first examine whether the
defendant could have affected the trial had the violation not occurred
and whether the particular violation was fundamental before deciding
whether to apply harmless error analysis to a Confrontation Clause
violation that affected only a portion of a trial.2 33 The difficulty in this
approach is its vagueness: When is a Confrontation Clause violation
fundamental? What does it mean for a defendant to be able to affect
a trial? The decisions supply no clear answer, and it is doubtful that
they could.
B. Confrontation Clause Violations as Structural Errors and the
Effect on the Overall Scope of the Right
Steven Shepard argues that the rule of automatic reversal has led
courts to narrow the scope of the rights that the rule protects. 234 Un-
fortunately, without some sort of rule of automatic reversal in the
Confrontation Clause context, the right will invariably be reduced to
its Roberts-era scope. Thus, the question becomes whether its scope as
a structural error will be greater than it was under Roberts. Given the
vagueness and subjectivity of the Roberts test, it is almost certain that
the automatic-reversal rule will better protect the right. Moreover, the
push to narrow the rights that the rule of automatic reversal protects
arises from the Supreme Court's categorical approach to the trial-er-
ror/structural-defect dichotomy. An approach that recognizes that vi-
olations of the same right may in some cases be a mere trial error and
in other cases be a structural defect does not run the same risks. In-
stead, courts will be free to openly discuss whether the violation is
sufficiently serious to require automatic reversal rather than having to
first characterize the right before proceeding to review the error.
CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court continues to decline to revisit Van Arsdall,
Crawford will, in practice, offer no greater protection to defendants
than Roberts. It is unlikely that the Court is entirely unaware of this
ramification of Van Arsdall or of the emergent trends in harmless er-
231 See Campbell v. Rice, 302 F.3d 892,898 (9th Cir. 2002); Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 1138,
1141 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995).
232 See State v. Garcia-Contreras, 953 P.2d 536, 540 (Ariz. 1998) (en banc); State v.
Calderon, 13 P.3d 871, 878-79 (Kani. 2000); State v. Bird, 2002 MT 2, 1[ 46-49, 308 Mont.
75, 43 P.3d 266.
233 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shisinday, supra note 24, at 22.
234 Shepard, supra note 56, at 1183.
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ror review in the courts of appeals. It is more likely that the Court is
more concerned with the rationales of its decisions than with its deci-
sions' substantive effects.2 35 Unfortunately, the Court's focus on de-
veloping a coherent theory of anti-inquisitorialism and its treatment
of the Confrontation Clause as a rule of evidentiary admissibility
rather than a procedural right has muddled the Confrontation Clause
in practice. Treating complete Confrontation Clause violations as
structural errors can solve the difficulties of contemporary Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence.
235 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004).
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